[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"court-category-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-agriculture-eu":3},{"court":4,"category":9,"stats":15,"decisions":28,"total":16,"page":16,"limit":41},{"id":5,"name":6,"country":7,"slug":8},50,"Court of Justice of the European Union","eu","court-of-justice-of-the-european-union",{"id":10,"slug":11,"name":12,"country":13,"createdAt":14},25,"agriculture-eu","Agriculture","EU","2026-07-08T14:16:12.945Z",{"totalDecisions":16,"dateRange":17,"topProvisions":19},1,{"min":18,"max":18},"2026-01-15T00:00:00.000Z",[20,24],{"provisionId":21,"code":22,"article":23,"count":16},"124753","Regulation","2022\u002F2472",{"provisionId":25,"code":26,"article":27,"count":16},"124757","Regulation (EU) 702\u002F2014","25",[29],{"id":30,"ecli":31,"slug":32,"caseNumber":33,"courtId":5,"decisionDate":18,"publicationDate":18,"fullText":34,"summary":35,"language":36,"source":37,"sourceUrl":38,"sourceTimestamp":18,"parsedAt":39,"updatedAt":40},"267","ECLI:EU:C:2026:19","ecli-eu-c-2026-19","C-52\u002F25","OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL\n\nBIONDI 1 Joined Cases C‑52\u002F25 and C‑53\u002F25 [Binanrier ( i )]\n\nRZ,\n\nGT (C‑52\u002F25)\n\nAX,\n\nUI (C‑53\u002F25)\n\nv\n\nRégion wallonne\n\n(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Mons  \n(Court of Appeal, Mons, Belgium)) \n\n(Reference for a preliminary ruling – State aid – Regulation (EU) No 702\u002F2014 – Block exemption for certain types of aid to the agriculture and forestry sectors – Aid to compensate for damage caused by an adverse climatic event that can be assimilated to a natural disaster – Reduction of the amount of aid in the event of failure to take out insurance – No possibility for the beneficiary of the aid to take out the required insurance)\n\n**I.** **Introduction**\n\n1\\. By its requests for a preliminary ruling in these two joined cases, the Cour d’appel de Mons (Court of Appeal, Mons, Belgium; ‘the referring court’) has referred three questions to the Court of Justice concerning the interpretation of Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 702\u002F2014, ( 2 ) a provision concerning aid intended to compensate small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) active in primary agricultural production for damage caused by adverse climatic events that can be assimilated to natural disasters. Aid that complies with all the conditions set out in that article and in Chapter I of that regulation is exempt from the requirement to notify the European Commission laid down in Article 108(3) TFEU.\n\n2\\. More specifically, the three questions referred by the referring court concern paragraph 9 of Article 25 of Regulation No 702\u002F2014, which provides that compensation constituting such aid is to be ‘reduced by 50% unless it is granted to beneficiaries who have taken out insurance covering at least 50% of their average annual production or production-related income and the statistically most frequent climatic risks in the Member State or region concerned for which insurance coverage is provided’. ( 3 )\n\n3\\. The questions referred for a preliminary ruling arise in proceedings concerning claims for compensation brought by a number of farmers (RZ, GT, AX and UI; ‘the appellants in the main proceedings’) who suffered damage as a result of the drought that affected Belgium from August 2016 to June 2017. That drought has been recognised by the Belgian authorities as an agricultural disaster giving rise to entitlement to compensation. For the purpose of calculating the compensation, the Belgian authorities applied a national provision ( 4 ) implementing Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014, under which the amount of compensation is reduced by 50% ‘if the injured party has not taken out insurance covering at least 50% of his or her production against climatic risks’.\n\n4\\. In the present case, since the appellants in the main proceedings had not taken out any insurance against climatic risks, the competent Belgian authorities reduced their compensation by 50% in accordance with the abovementioned national provision.\n\n5\\. However, the appellants in the main proceedings lodged an appeal with the Belgian courts, arguing that they had been unable to take out insurance because, at the time the damage occurred, it was not possible in Belgium to insure their farms against certain climatic risks, such as drought.\n\n6\\. Following various proceedings, the Cour d’appel de Mons (Court of Appeal, Mons) was seised of the disputes referred to in the main proceedings. It emerges from the order for reference that, first, the risk of drought is not one of the most frequent climatic risks in Belgium, since the most frequent climatic risk in that Member State is hail; second, at the time of the events, there was no insurance against drought in Belgium, but there was insurance against hail; and, third, the appellants in the main proceedings asserted that their farms consist of permanent and temporary meadows and grassland used for feeding livestock, and that, as such, those meadows and that grassland are not insurable against the risk of hail.\n\n7\\. The referring court therefore decided to stay the proceedings and to refer three questions for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014.\n\n8\\. At the request of the Court of Justice, the present Opinion focuses on the third question referred for a preliminary ruling, in which the referring court asks: ‘Does [Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014] allow the Member State concerned not to reduce the aid intended to compensate farmers for damage caused by a climatic event considered to be a natural disaster, where the aid beneficiary demonstrates that the type of production in which he or she engages (in this case, permanent and temporary meadows, as well as grassland for feeding livestock, and not crops) is not insurable in the Member State concerned (in this case, Belgium) against the statistically most frequent climatic risks, up to an amount of at least 50% of the average annual production or production-related income of his or her farm?’\n\n**II.** **Analysis**\n\n9\\. By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014 must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may be authorised not to reduce by 50% aid intended to compensate for damage caused by adverse climatic events that can be assimilated to natural disasters, where the beneficiary of the aid demonstrates that it was not possible to obtain insurance cover for the type of production of his or her farm against the statistically most frequent climatic risks, as that was not insurable in that Member State.\n\n10\\. To answer the third question referred for a preliminary ruling by the referring court, it is necessary to interpret Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014.\n\n11\\. According to settled case-law, for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. ( 5 )\n\n12\\. First of all, with regard to Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014, referred to in point 2 of the present Opinion, that provision stipulates that the aid in question is to be reduced by 50% unless the beneficiary has taken out an insurance policy that must meet two requirements.\n\n13\\. In the first place, that insurance policy must cover at least 50% of the average annual production or corresponding income, and, in the second place, it must cover the climatic risks that are statistically most frequent in the Member State or region concerned for which insurance cover is provided.\n\n14\\. With regard to the second requirement, it is clear from the wording of the provision in question (in most of the language versions, as noted in point 17 of the present Opinion) that insurance cover for the most frequent climatic risks must be ‘provided’. In my opinion, it follows, conversely, that if insurance cover is not provided for those most frequent climatic risks, the condition relating to the need to take out an insurance policy cannot apply and, consequently, the reduction in aid cannot apply either. Furthermore, such a condition appears to be reasonable: it seems illogical to require, as a condition for obtaining part of the compensation, that an insurance contract be entered into where cover for the relevant risk is not available.\n\n15\\. A literal analysis of the provision in question would therefore seem to lead to an interpretation whereby the reduction in compensation does not apply if it can be demonstrated that it was not possible to take out the insurance policy on which the non-application of that reduction is conditional, since the beneficiary is not provided with insurance cover for the statistically most frequent climatic risks.\n\n16\\. Two further observations are relevant in that regard.\n\n17\\. First, the different language versions of the provision in question do not all coincide perfectly. However, the Italian-language version of the provision from which I have derived the abovementioned interpretation is confirmed by the text of several other language versions, including the English-language version, which refers to ‘risks … for which insurance coverage is provided’, the German-language version, which mentions ‘ *Risiken … für die Versicherungsschutz gegeben ist* ’, and the Spanish-language version, which refers to ‘ *riesgos … para los que se proporciona cobertura de seguros* ’. Several other language versions of the provision are also along the same lines. ( 6 ) The French-language version is less clear on that point, but its wording is not incompatible with the interpretation of the provision in question considered in point 15 above. ( 7 )\n\n18\\. Second, that interpretation is confirmed in the Communication from the Commission on guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas. ( 8 )\n\n19\\. Point 363 of the 2014 Guidelines, concerning aid to compensate for damage to agricultural production or the means of agricultural production and to prevent damage, expressly states that ‘derogation from this condition is only possible if a Member State can convincingly show that, despite all reasonable efforts, affordable insurance covering the statistically most frequent climatic risks in the Member State or region concerned was not available at the time the damage occurred.’ ( 9 )\n\n20\\. It can therefore be inferred from that point in the abovementioned Guidelines that the only possible derogation from the condition of taking out an insurance policy in order to avoid a 50% reduction in compensation is the lack of availability, on the date on which the damage occurred, of insurance covering the risks in question, despite the injured party having made all reasonable efforts to obtain such a policy.\n\n21\\. Although a document such as the Guidelines is binding only on the Commission ( 10 ) and therefore does not necessarily bind either the Court of Justice or the national courts in their interpretation of the provision in question, it nevertheless constitutes an important source of interpretation. That is especially true in a case such as the present one, where the question of interpretation relates to a regulation issued by the Commission itself. In such circumstances, a document such as the Guidelines constitutes the interpretation of the act by the institution that adopted that act.\n\n22\\. The interpretation of Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014, set out in point 15 of the present Opinion, appears to be confirmed by both contextual and teleological analysis.\n\n23\\. In contextual terms, that provision must be placed within the general context of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), in which risk management has become a crucial element, with the aim of increasing the resilience of farms facing growing risks, particularly those linked to increasingly frequent catastrophic events related to climate change, while promoting the spread of practices that increase risk prevention and adaptation. Those objectives have been considered fundamental both in the current programming period 2023 to 2027, which envisages an integrated risk management system, ( 11 ) and in the previous period (2014 to 2022). ( 12 ) Adaptation to climate change and increasing the resilience of farms in that context are also considered key priorities within the CAP, in the light of which risk management must be considered. ( 13 )\n\n24\\. Regulation No 702\u002F2014 and the new Regulation 2022\u002F2472 fit within that framework and constitute an implementation of those policy objectives. Under those regulations, aid to compensate for losses caused by adverse climatic events that can be assimilated to natural disasters, as referred to in Article 25 of Regulation No 702\u002F2014, falls within the framework of ‘risk and crisis management aid’, along with aid for the costs of the prevention and eradication of animal diseases and plant pests, and aid for insurance premiums. ( 14 )\n\n25\\. In that context, from a teleological point of view, as highlighted by the parties who have submitted observations to the Court, ( 15 ) the specific purpose of Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014 is to encourage farmers to take out insurance against the climatic risks that cause most of the damage eligible for compensation, in order to reduce the financial burden on the community through agricultural aid granted to compensate for damage related to adverse climatic events.\n\n26\\. That purpose of the provision in question is apparent from recital 54 of Regulation No 702\u002F2014, from which it can be inferred that, since ‘primary agricultural production is exposed to particular natural, climatic and health risks and crises … good risk and crisis management is a key tool for a sustainable and competitive agricultural sector’. In that context, therefore, ‘State aid for making good losses caused by adverse climatic events that can be assimilated to natural disasters … should be limited to helping beneficiaries facing particular difficulties despite having undertaken reasonable efforts to minimise such risks’.\n\n27\\. In the same vein, the abovementioned Commission Guidelines ( 16 ) emphasise that ‘in order to further improve risk management, beneficiaries must be encouraged to take out insurance wherever possible’.\n\n28\\. With that objective in mind, in order for the reduction not to be applied, aid beneficiaries must therefore have made all reasonable efforts to limit the risks associated with damage resulting from the adverse climatic event. However, once that has been demonstrated – as stated in the Commission’s own Guidelines – an undertaking that cannot be covered by insurance for such losses should be granted the maximum aid intensity. ( 17 )\n\n29\\. An analysis of the purpose of Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014 confirms the interpretation that the reduction in compensation does not apply where it is demonstrated that it was not possible to take out the insurance policy in question because insurance cover was not available for the statistically most frequent climatic risks. However, it adds the further condition that it must also be demonstrated that the beneficiaries of the aid have made all reasonable efforts to take out such a policy to limit the risks associated with damage resulting from the adverse climatic event.\n\n30\\. The arguments raised by the Commission in its observations do not preclude this interpretation of Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014.\n\n31\\. Indeed, in the first place, as can be seen from points 12 to 21 of the present Opinion, this interpretation is consistent with the wording of the provision, which, although it does not refer – as asserted by the Commission – to the reasons for the absence of insurance, nevertheless expressly stipulates that insurance cover must be provided.\n\n32\\. In the second place, my interpretation of Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014 is not contrary to the settled case-law of the Court, according to which the provisions of a regulation on State aid providing for a block exemption and the conditions laid down therein must be interpreted strictly. ( 18 ) Indeed, such an interpretation does not attribute to the regulatory provision and the conditions laid down therein a broader scope than that which can be inferred from its literal wording. On the contrary, the proposed interpretation, in accordance with the wording of the provision itself, avoids a possible interpretation that, as noted in point 14 of the present Opinion, would lead to an unreasonable application of the conditions laid down therein.\n\n33\\. In the third place, that interpretation does not conflict with the need – referred to by the Commission – to ensure uniform interpretation of the regulation at issue in the various Member States. Indeed, it guarantees that the provision can be applied on the basis of objective criteria (a demonstration that cover is impossible and that the beneficiary has made all reasonable efforts), which are applicable in the same way in all Member States, even though the circumstances (such as whether it is possible to take out an insurance policy in a given case) might vary.\n\n34\\. In the fourth place, the Commission refers in its observations to the requirement for Member States to notify the Commission of any aid that is more favourable to farmers so as to take account of the fact that they are unable to insure themselves against the statistically most frequent climatic risks.\n\n35\\. On that point, I note that the Court has observed that Regulation No 702\u002F2014, which was adopted pursuant to Article 108(4) TFEU, provides, in Article 3, that, notwithstanding the general obligation to notify each measure intended to grant or alter ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 108(3) TFEU, which constitutes one of the fundamental features of the monitoring system in the field of State aid, a Member State may, under that regulation, rely on the exemption from that requirement if an aid measure which it adopted or an aid project which it plans to adopt fulfils the conditions laid down therein. ( 19 )\n\n36\\. Therefore, an interpretation of Article 25 of Regulation No 702\u002F2014 that, in the absence of notification by the Member State, would deny the compensation provided for therein to a beneficiary who fulfils the conditions referred to in that provision for the grant of aid would be contrary to the scheme of the regulation itself.\n\n37\\. On that point, I note that the condition relating to the conclusion of the insurance contract provided for in paragraph 9 of that article is not a condition relating to the grant of the aid but concerns the amount of the aid granted.\n\n38\\. In the same vein, an interpretation of that provision to the effect that, in the absence of notification by the Member State, a beneficiary who satisfies all the conditions under that provision cannot receive the full amount of the aid even if it is established by a court that insurance covering the most frequent climatic risks was not objectively available to that beneficiary at the time the damage occurred, would not be merely contrary to the wording of that provision, as follows from points 12 to 21 above. It would also be contrary to the scheme of Regulation No 702\u002F2014 inasmuch as it would deny full compensation to a beneficiary who meets the requirements laid down in Article 25(1) of that regulation for receiving the aid. Such an interpretation would also go beyond the objectives pursued by that regulation, referred to in points 25 to 29 above, and would be contrary to the principle of proportionality referred to in recital 8 of Regulation No 702\u002F2014.\n\n39\\. In conclusion, it follows from the foregoing considerations that Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014 must, in my view, be interpreted as meaning that the 50% reduction in compensation in respect of aid intended to make good damage caused by adverse climatic events that can be assimilated to natural disasters, laid down in that provision, does not apply where the beneficiary of the aid demonstrates that, despite having made all reasonable efforts to take out an insurance policy to limit the risks associated with damage resulting from the adverse climatic event, it was not possible to take out an insurance policy because no insurance cover was available for the type of production of his or her farm for the statistically most frequent climatic risks.\n\n40\\. In the present case, the appellants in the main proceedings have argued that although, in general, at the time the adverse event occurred in Belgium, it was possible to obtain insurance cover for the most frequent climatic risks, namely hail, such cover was not available for the specific type of production carried out by the appellants in the main proceedings.\n\n41\\. It is for the referring court to verify those factual circumstances and to determine that the appellants in the main proceedings made all reasonable efforts to take out an insurance policy to limit the risks associated with damage resulting from adverse climatic events and that the type of production of the appellants in the main proceedings was indeed not insurable in the Member State concerned against the statistically most frequent climatic risks.\n\n**III.** **Conclusion** 1 ( i ) The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.\n\n42\\. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should answer the third question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Cour d’appel de Mons (Court of Appeal, Mons, Belgium) as follows: Article 25(9) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 702\u002F2014 of 25 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that the 50% reduction in compensation in respect of aid intended to make good damage caused by adverse climatic events that can be assimilated to natural disasters, laid down in that provision, does not apply where the beneficiary of the aid demonstrates that, despite having made all reasonable efforts to take out an insurance policy to limit the risks associated with damage resulting from the adverse climatic event, it was not possible to take out an insurance policy because no insurance cover was available for the type of production of his or her farm for the statistically most frequent climatic risks. It is for the referring court to ascertain those specific factual circumstances.\n\n* * *\n\n( 2 ) Commission Regulation of 25 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ([OJ 2014 L 193, p. 1](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Foj\u002FJOL_2014_193_R_TOC)). That regulation was in force until 31 December 2022 and was replaced, as of 1 January 2023, by Commission Regulation (EU) 2022\u002F2472 of 14 December 2022 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 [TFEU] ([OJ 2022 L 327, p. 1](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Foj\u002FJOL_2022_327_R_TOC)). 3 ( 4 ) Article 6 of the arrêté du Gouvernement wallon considérant comme une calamité agricole la sécheresse d'août 2016 à juin 2017, délimitant l’étendue géographique de cette calamité et déterminant l'indemnisation des dommages (Order of the Walloon Government considering the drought from August 2016 to June 2017 to be an agricultural disaster, delimiting the geographical extent of that disaster and determining compensation for the damage).\n\n( 5 ) See judgment of 19 September 2024, Agrarmarkt Austria ([C‑350\u002F23](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2024%3A771), [EU:C:2024:771](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2024%3A771), paragraph [57](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2024%3A771#point57) and the case-law cited). 6 ( 7 ) The French-language version of Article 25(10) of Regulation 2022\u002F2472 has undergone a change in its last sentence compared to the text of Article 25(9) of Regulation No 702\u002F2014. Such a change cannot be found in the other language versions. Whereas the version of the text in Regulation No 702\u002F2014 referred to the ‘ *risques climatiques statistiquement les plus fréquents dans l’État membre ou la région concernés* , couverte par une assurance’, the new version refers to the ‘ *risques climatiques statistiquement les plus fréquents dans l’État membre ou la région concernés* que couvre l’assurance’. That amendment is in line with my interpretation of the provision.\n\n( 8 ) Communication from the Commission, European Union Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas 2014 to 2020 ([OJ 2014 C 204, p. 1](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Foj\u002FJOC_2014_204_R_TOC); ‘the 2014 Guidelines’); see also Communication from the Commission, Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas ([OJ 2022 C 485, p. 1](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Foj\u002FJOC_2022_485_R_TOC); ‘the 2022 Guidelines’). 9 ( 10 ) See judgment of 8 March 2016, Greece v Commission ([C‑431\u002F14 P](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2016%3A145), [EU:C:2016:145](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2016%3A145), paragraphs [69](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2016%3A145#point69) and [70](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2016%3A145#point70)). 11 ( 12 ) See, inter alia, Regulation (EU) No 1305\u002F2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698\u002F2005 ([OJ 2013 L 347, p. 487](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Foj\u002FJOL_2013_347_R_TOC)), in particular Article 36, entitled ‘Risk management’, and Annex VI.\n\n( 13 ) On that point, see recitals 29 and 30 of Regulation (EU) 2021\u002F2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305\u002F2013 and (EU) No 1307\u002F2013 ([OJ 2021 L 435, p. 1](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Foj\u002FJOL_2021_435_R_TOC)). 14 ( 15 ) Namely, the Commission and the Kingdom of Belgium. 16 ( 17 ) The points of the Guidelines referred to in the previous footnote state that, ‘regarding aid to compensate for losses caused by adverse climatic events which can be assimilated to a natural disaster, in order to avoid the risk of distorting competition, aid at the maximum aid intensity should be granted only to an undertaking that cannot be covered for such losses by insurance.’\n\n( 18 ) See judgment of 20 May 2021, Azienda Sanitaria Provinciale di Catania ([C‑128\u002F19](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2021%3A401), [EU:C:2021:401](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2021%3A401), paragraph [42](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2021%3A401#point42) and the case-law cited).\n\n( 19 ) See judgment of 20 May 2021, Azienda Sanitaria Provinciale di Catania ([C‑128\u002F19](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2021%3A401), [EU:C:2021:401](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2021%3A401), paragraph [42](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2021%3A401#point42)), and, by analogy, judgment of 5 March 2019, Eesti Pagar ([C‑349\u002F17](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2019%3A172), [EU:C:2019:172](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2019%3A172), paragraph [59](http:\u002F\u002Fpublications.europa.eu\u002Fresource\u002Fecli\u002FECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2019%3A172#point59) and the case-law cited).","","en","cjeu","https:\u002F\u002Feur-lex.europa.eu\u002Flegal-content\u002FEN\u002FTXT\u002FHTML\u002F?uri=CELEX:62025CC0052","2026-07-08T14:16:03.557Z","2026-07-13T00:30:06.032Z",20]